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Fewer statistical tests... or better ones? 
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In a recent Perception editorial, Eli Brenner highlighted the serious problem that 
many significant results in psychology are not replicable (Brenner, 2016). Brenner 
identifies a plausible reason for this: that researchers often carry out significance tests 
on effects that they had not planned to examine in the first place. His solution is to 
avoid doing any statistical tests that you didn’t originally plan to do. We argue that a 
better solution is to abandon traditional frequentist null-hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST), and instead use Bayesian data analysis, which can be used to 
examine unexpected effects without violating the assumptions on which the 
calculations are based. Bayesians need not worry about polluting the scientific record 
with false postives just because their question arose after data collection. 
 
Brenner is absolutely correct that, strictly speaking, we should not carry out a 
traditional test of a null hypothesis unless we had planned to do that test in the first 
place: the p-value is valid only if we stick to exactly what we had planned to do. If we 
think of an analysis after looking at the data, we can’t compute a meaningful p-value. 
This is because the p-value is worked out by considering a hypothetical infinite 
sequence of repetitions of the experiment and analysis, and if we allow ourselves to 
change the experiment or analysis in unpredictable, non-predefined ways, then we 
can’t define what we mean by a repetition, so we can’t calculate the p-value. This is a 
major problem, because very often in psychology, we obtain unexpected patterns of 
results that are potentially very revealing about what is going on. If we analyse these 
patterns by applying NHST as if we were going to do that all along, we obtain an 
essentially meaningless p-value; this p-value can greatly overestimate the true 
statistical significance of the result because the only reason that we are doing the test 
is that the data suggested that the difference might be significant. This is why we 
obtain many false positives. 
 
Brenner’s suggested solution is to avoid statistical analysis of any effects that we had 
not planned to test for. To analyse such unexpected effects using traditional NHST, 
we should throw away the data and repeat the experiment, this time with the intention 
of doing the new analysis. But this approach, while technically correct, is hugely 
wasteful of time and money, and could lead us to ignore potentially exciting 
discoveries. The data are telling us something, and to refuse to analyse an unexpected 
effect because our statistical tools can’t handle it is like refusing a bowl of soup 
because there are only forks on the table; a better solution is to find a spoon. In the 
case of data analysis, the better solution is to use Bayesian methods. These can be 
applied to any data at any time, regardless of what the experimenter’s original 
intentions were (Berger & Berry, 1988). 
 
The ability to apply a Bayesian analysis to study unexpected effects is a major 
advantage of Bayesian statistics. But there is another advantage of Bayesian methods 
which stems from a deep and often-ignored problem with null-hypothesis significance 
testing: even if we stick to exactly what we planned to do, and calculate a valid p-
value, we haven’t answered the question we really wanted to ask. The p-value gives 
the probability of obtaining a result as extreme (or more) as the one we did obtain, 
given that the null hypothesis is true. But that’s not what we want to know – we want 
to know the probability of the null hypothesis given the data, which can be calculated 
using Bayesian methods. Berger and Berry (1988) give a nice example of a 
hypothetical experiment and data in which the null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 
level, but the probability of the null hypothesis given the data is actually quite high. It 
is not that NHST gives the wrong answer – it gives the right answer to the wrong 
question. Bayesian analysis gives the right answer to the right question. 
 
Until relatively recently, uptake of Bayesian data analysis was hindered by the lack of 
accessible textbooks and the difficulty of calculating the probability distributions. But 
the recent emergence of introductory texts and free software packages has removed 
many of the impediments to rational scientific inference. For those raised in the 
frequentist tradition it can be tricky to get the ‘Zen’ of the Bayesian approach, but 
Dienes (2008) provides an engaging introduction of various paradigmatic approaches 
to inference. The computational implementation of Bayesian methods used to have a 
high barrier to entry, but software packages such as JAGS (Plummer, 2003) and 
STAN (Carpenter, Gelman, Hoffman, Lee, & Goodrich, 2016) can now do the heavy 
lifting. Kruschke (2015) provides a very thorough introduction to the practical aspects 
of Bayesian data analysis methods using these packages. High-level software 
packages are now emerging, such as BRMS (https://github.com/paul-buerkner/brms) 
and RStanArm (https://github.com/stan-dev/rstanarm) allowing users to run common 
statistical tests with minimal effort in the R statistics environment, for example. At the 
most accessible end of the spectrum, we have JASP (https://jasp-stats.org), which 
provides a friendly point-and-click interface to run both frequentist and Bayesian 
versions of common statistical tests.  
 
We may be on the threshold of a revolution in the way that data are analysed (Brooks, 
2003). Indeed, the journal Basic and Applied Social Psychology recently banned the 
use of null hypothesis significance testing, and will no longer publish a paper that 
reports a p-value (Trafimow & Marks, 2015); but they didn’t ban Bayesian methods. 
Bayesian methods are more intuitively appealing; indeed, although most quoted 
confidence limits are calculated using traditional frequentist methods, a recent survey 
found that a majority of researchers interpreted confidence intervals as Bayes credible 
intervals (Hoekstra, Morey, & Rouder, 2014; see the results for question 4 of their 
questionnaire), which suggests that Bayes credible intervals are what most people 
really want to calculate anyway. Given the recent proliferation of introductory texts 
on Bayesian data analysis, and of free software to do this, we would urge researchers 
to let go of traditional frequentist methods and embrace Bayesian methods, which will 
almost certainly become the dominant statistical paradigm in the future. 
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